In Making Things Happen, James Woodward influentially combines a causal modeling analysis of actual causation with an interventionist semantics for the counterfactuals encoded in causal models.
Introduction
It has become common to deploy causal models in attempting to analyze actual (or token) causation.
1 I will call such accounts causal modeling analyses of actual causation (CMAACs). Causal models are systems of structural equations, which encode patterns of counterfactual dependence between variables. 2 The variables in question can be used to represent the relata of actual causal relations, which are usually taken to be token events. In virtue of the fact that causal models encode counterfactuals, CMAACs are a variety of counterfactual analysis of actual causation (CAAC).
Whether CMAACs are reductive turns (in part) upon the semantics the counterfactuals encoded in causal models are given. Woodward (2003) has influentially combined a CMAAC (ibid. p. 84) with an interventionist semantics for such counterfactuals (ibid. e.g. pp. 42-44).
Interventions are defined by Woodward (ibid. p. 98) in terms of (among other things) (a) actual causation; and (b) directed paths in causal models. 3 The appeal to each of these notions stands in the way of a reduction of actual causation to counterfactual dependence, where the latter is reductively analyzed in terms of more basic, non-causal facts.
Woodward argues that CAACs -including CMAACs -founded upon the interventionist semantics perform better than those founded on the most well-known rival semantics, due to Lewis (1979) . Lewis's proposal is that the counterfactuals relevant to actual causation be evaluated 1 See, for example, Glymour and Wimberly (2007) , Halpern (2008) , Halpern and Hitchcock (ms.), 4 Second: I do not seek to argue that the combination of (i) standard CMAACs with (ii) an interventionist semantics for the counterfactuals encoded in casual models yields an extensionally inadequate theory of causation. My aim is, rather, to defend (in the face of Woodward's putative counterexamples) the extensional adequacy of the combination of (i) standard CMAACs with (iii) a Lewisian semantics for the counterfactuals encoded in causal models. For the most part, I will be arguing that the combination of (i) with (iii) yields the same verdicts about causation as the combination of (i) with
(ii) does. The tie-breaker between (ii) and (iii) is that adopting (iii) (but not (ii)) maintains the possibility of a reduction of causation to non-causal facts.
Causal Models
A causal model M is an ordered pair ⟨V, E⟩ where V is a set of variables, and E is a set of structural equations that encode the (non-backtracking) counterfactual dependencies among the variables in V. A model M = ⟨V, E⟩ can be given a graphical representation by taking the variables in V as the vertices of the graph and drawing a directed edge (or 'arrow') from one variable to another just in case the value of the second is a function of the value of the first according to the structural equations in E. An ordered sequence ⟨X, V 1 , ..., V m , Y⟩ is a directed path in M just in case X, V 1 , ..., V m , Y ∈ V and there is a directed edge from X to V 1 , a directed edge from V 1 to ... 5 Thus, although they are standardly called 'causal' models, such models don't encode causal relations, but rather relations of (non-backtracking) counterfactual dependence. 
That is, Y = y counterfactually depends upon X = x under the contingency γ just in case Y = y counterfactually depends upon X = x when all off-path variables are held fixed at the values they receive in γ.
The truth-values of ( †) and ( ‡) can be evaluated with respect to a model M = ⟨V, E⟩ such that X, Z 1 , …, Z n , Y ∈ V. Counterfactual ( †) is evaluated by replacing the equations for X, Z 1 , …, and Z n in E with the equations X = x, Z 1 = z 1 * , …, and Z n = z n * , while leaving all other equations intact. This yields a new set of equations E'. Counterfactual ( †) is true in the original model M = ⟨V, E⟩ just in case, in the solution to E', Y = y. Counterfactual ( ‡) is evaluated analogously, but with the equation for X instead replaced with X = x'. Hitchcock (2001a, p. 275 ) dubs counterfactuals like ( †) and ( ‡) explicitly non-foretracking (ENF) counterfactuals. The idea is that,
because the values of off-path variables are held fixed, the counterfactual influence of X is not allowed to foretrack to Y along paths other than P.
With this background in place, we are now in a position to describe standard CMAACs, 6 Terminology due to Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 844) . (y' ≠ y) of Y such that the ENF counterfactuals ( †) and ( ‡) are true in M.
7 X = x, and Z 1 , …, and Z n were to take the values Z 1 = z 1 * , …, and Z n = z n * (so that the antecedent of ( †) is realized), then all remaining on-path variables (namely, V 1 , …, V m , and Y) would take their actual values. Intuitively this means that setting Z 1 = z 1 * , …, and Z n = z n * doesn't interfere with the causal process from X to Y (see Halpern and Pearl 2005, p. 854 The third prominent account of permissibility, developed by Halpern (2008, pp. 203-205) and Halpern and Hitchcock (2010, pp. 400-403) , 10 adds to the non-interference requirement the further requirement that a possible world (presumably the closest) at which X = x', and Z 1 = z 1 * , …, and Z n = z n * (so that the antecedent of ( ‡) is realized) is at least as normal as the actual world. Call this the 'normality' account of permissibility. To this point, advocates of the normality account have yet to furnish a precise normalcy metric over possible worlds. For this reason, I regard it as less satisfactory than the others. Still, for present purposes, the details of any such metric won't matter. Woodward (2003, p. 145) claims that the sort of counterfactuals relevant to causal claims should 8 This assumption is implicit in the standard rule -described three paragraphs ago -for evaluating counterfactuals with respect to a model. It is a straightforward consequence of the Lewisian semantics to be described in §4, below. Woodward (2003, p. 83-84 ) also seemingly takes it as true in developing his own CMAAC.
The Interventionist Semantics
9 Variants on this second account of permissibility are described by Woodward (2003, pp. 83-84) and by Halpern and Pearl (2005, p. 853) . These variants also imply that the actual contingency is always permissible (see Woodward 2003, p. 83; and Halpern and Pearl 2005, p. 855 Woodward defines the notion of an intervention in terms of that of a directed path, which is a causal modeling notion that he (ultimately) defines in terms of interventionist counterfactuals.
While this circularity does not in itself prevent a reductive analysis of actual causation in terms of facts about counterfactual dependence, it does ensure that the interventionist semantics does not deliver a reduction of the counterfactual dependencies in terms of which actual causation is analyzed to more basic facts.
Given that the interventionist semantics involves us in these circularities and consequently is not an apt foundation for a fully reductive CAAC (whether a SCMAAC or otherwise), one might wonder why Woodward adopts it. This might seem especially puzzling given the existence of a well-known non-causal semantics developed by Lewis (1979) .
The Lewisian Semantics
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Lewis's semantics can be explicated as follows (1979, p. 462) . 13 Woodward (2003, pp. 127-133) observes that, in making this appeal to possible worlds involving miracles (that is, violations of the laws of @), the Lewisian semantics does not differ from the interventionist semantics. The interventionist semantics requires that the consequent of a counterfactual be true in those worlds where its antecedent is made true by an intervention. Such hypothetical interventions obviously needn't actually occur (where the antecedent of the counterfactual in question is false, they typically don't). If @ is deterministic, then a possible (but 13 The semantics for counterfactuals that I describe here corresponds to Lewis's (1979, p. 462) 'Analysis 1' of counterfactuals. Lewis attempts to subsume this analysis under a general 'closestworlds' semantics ('Analysis 2') that he regards as fully adequate to the ordinary language counterfactual (Lewis 1979, p. 465) . For the reason noted at the end of §1 (the first of the two 'preliminary points'), this latter project needn't concern us here.
14 If x * = x, so that (*) expresses a true-antecedent counterfactual, no divergence from @ during the transition period starting at !!! ! is needed for X = x * to obtain, and so (assuming determinism) (*) is true just in case y * = y. "One of the features of Lewis's theory that has been most resisted by commentators is 15 As a referee pointed out to me, Loewer (2007, esp. pp. 300-302) observes that a difference in the initial microstates of two worlds may be reflected in a difference in macrostate only much later in time. If this is correct then -where the possible values of X represent macroscopic events or states of affairs -it may be possible to set X to some target value X = x * via a difference in initial microconditions that does not manifest itself macroscopically until at (or shortly before) the time that X comes to take the value X = x * . Hence -where Y is also a macrovariable -this difference in initial conditions may not independently influence Y. It is, however, at best unclear whether implementing counterfactual antecedents in this way will always be possible (especially without an independent influence on Y). In the absence of a proof that it is, I shall follow Woodward and
Lewis in supposing that miracles are needed to implement counterfactual antecedents.
12 his insistence that in many cases, the right counterfactuals to consider in explicating causal claims will be those whose antecedents require the occurrence of a 'miracle,' a violation of some law. Although my version of a manipulability theory differs in various respects from Lewis's theory … it agrees with his on this important point." (2003, p. 133) One way of thinking about a hypothetical intervention, then, is as a miracle that meets certain constraints: in particular, those captured by IN and I3 (see Woodward 2003, pp. 132-133, 144-145) . As already noted, those constraints involve problematic (from the reductionist's perspective) appeals to the notions of (a) actual causation, and (b) a directed path in a causal model. If we strip away those constraints, then we are left with something along the lines of the Lewisian semantics.
The central issue is therefore whether the constraints are necessary. Woodward's counterexample to the Lewisian semantics (to be considered in the next section) is advanced in a bid to show that I3 at least is necessary.
While Lewis focuses on simple-antecedent counterfactuals (presumably because his own CAAC appeals exclusively to these), a proposal that seems Lewisian in spirit is to evaluate complex-antecedent counterfactuals of form (**)
respect to those worlds w* which have the same initial conditions as @ and in which each variable mentioned in the antecedent is set to the specified value by means of the smallest necessary miracle occurring during a transition period starting shortly beforehand. 16 Otherwise, the worlds 16 More precisely, suppose there is a pair of times,
, and an interval of time,
, which is shortly before the beginning of ! ! !! ! * * , and which is also such that the actual laws together with the total state of w* at ! ! !! ! * * ! entail that, throughout ! ! !! ! * * , the event represented by X i =x i ** (x i ** ≠ x i * ) will occur. Then w* contains a miracle during the period starting at ! ! !! ! * * ! and ending at the end of ! ! !! ! * * which is just large enough to ensure that X i instead takes value X i =x i * (as required to implement the 13 w* conform to the laws of @. A counterfactual of the form (**) comes out true just in case its consequent is true in all such worlds w*. The possible need to appeal to more than one miracle to realize the antecedent of counterfactuals like (**) is in analogy to the interventionist semantics, on which more than one intervention may be required to realize the antecedent of such a counterfactual.
The Lewisian semantics just outlined does not make any use of causal or counterfactual notions. In specifying how the relevant counterfactuals are to be evaluated, appeal is made to possible worlds, to times, and to facts about laws and matters of particular fact. None of these notions is (obviously) to be analyzed in terms of causation or counterfactuals. Adopting the Lewisian semantics therefore seems compatible with maintaining the potential reductivity of CAACs, including SCMAACs.
In order to motivate his preference for the interventionist semantics -which is incompatible with maintaining potential reductivity -Woodward advances a counterexample to CAACs founded upon the Lewisian semantics. In the next section, I discuss this example and argue that it does not tell against the combination of the Lewisian semantics with sophisticated, SCMAACs.
Woodward's Counterexample to the Lewisian Semantics
Woodward uses the following example to motivate his rejection of the Lewisian semantics in favor of his own interventionist semantics:
"You are driving on an unfamiliar freeway in the left-hand lane when, unexpectedly, the exit you need to take appears on the right. You are unable to get over in time to exit and as a result are late for your appointment. There are only two lanes, left and right. Driving in the left-hand lane (rather than the right) caused you to be late." (Woodward 2003, p. 142) Let binary variable L take value 1 if you're in the left-hand lane at the relevant time, 0 if you're in antecedent of (**)). One might be tempted to locate the problem in the fact that the Lewisian miracle (the extra neurons firing in your brain) is allowed to occur during a transition period beginning shortly before the event that it is intended to secure (namely, your being in the right lane when you arrive at the exit). After all, your hitting a pothole in the right-hand lane is an event that occurs during this transition period. Perhaps we could avoid the problem by modifying the Lewisian semantics to avoid transition periods (cp. Lewis 1979, p. 463) . We might require that the miracle implementing the antecedent of (CC1) occur when you arrive at the exit, rather than in an interval starting shortly before you arrive at the exit. That is, we might require that it be (what we might call) a 'late miracle', rather than an 'early miracle'.
But Woodward (2003, p. 142 ) argues that such a modification of the Lewisian semantics will 15 not help. The occurrence of a late miracle implementing the antecedent of (CC1) means that "your car dematerializes and reappears instantaneously in the right-hand lane just before the exit" (ibid.).
The trouble is "it is not at all unlikely that the very occurrence of this miracle will produce effects that will interfere with your exiting" (ibid.). For example, Woodward suggests, it may result in your car colliding with other cars. So whether we go for the 'early miracles' or the 'late miracles' version of the Lewisian semantics, (CC1) may well come out false. 17 Since, nevertheless, your being in the left-hand lane (L = 1) is intuitively a cause of your being late (T = 1), the worry is that founding a CAAC upon the Lewisian semantics will result in under-generation.
The interventionist semantics avoids this problem because it is a consequence of the definition of an intervention that an intervention realizing the antecedent of (CC1) satisfy condition I3: it must not be such that a variable representing it lies on a path to T that bypasses
L.
18 As Woodward (2003, pp. 144-145) says:
17 Lewis (1979, p. 463) himself prefers early miracles on the grounds that late miracles make for "abrupt discontinuities" (ibid.). Perhaps it was in part because of worries about the effects of such discontinuities that he rejected late miracles. Still, if Woodward is correct, the early miracles version of the Lewisian semantics doesn't fare any better. 18 To avoid introducing an undesirable model-relativity into the interventionist semantics, one might demand that I3 be fulfilled with respect to all appropriate models. Alternatively, one might require that it be fulfilled with respect to any model that has a variable set that is 'sufficiently rich' in the sense defined by Hitchcock (2001b, p. For discussion of whether the interventionist semantics renders the truth-values of counterfactuals model-relative and, if so, how this relativity may be overcome, see Strevens (2007 Strevens ( , 2008 and Woodward (2008) . Perhaps the miracle needed to prevent a crash (despite your suddenly changing lanes) would 19 It is important here that the non-occurrence of the intervention should be construed as involving the non-occurrence of all of its constituents and not, for example, merely the nonoccurrence of the crash-preventing miracle. But this just reflects a requirement that is quite generally essential to the success of CAACs (see Lewis 2004, p. 90) . But note that this does not directly tell against the ability of the Lewisian semantics to serve as a foundation for an extensionally adequate CAAC. 21 In particular, according to SCMAACs, the truth of (CC1) isn't necessary for L = 1 to be a cause of T = 1. What is necessary is that, in some appropriate causal model (which may have a variable set that is richer than {L, T}), T = 1 counterfactually depends upon L = 1 under a permissible contingency.
But the existence of counterfactual dependence of T = 1 upon L = 1 in an appropriate model under a permissible contingency, when all counterfactuals are evaluated using the Lewisian semantics, follows straightforwardly from the truth of (CC1) when evaluated using the interventionist semantics.
To illustrate this, suppose that we adopt the 'late miracles' variant of the Lewisian semantics.
Then, although there may be no path 〈L, T〉 in the Lewisian model constructed from the variable set {L, T}, there is a path 〈L, T〉 in the Lewisian model constructed from the variable set {L, T, C,
That this is so can be seen by considering the counterfactual (CC2).
Evaluating ( In virtue of having a true antecedent and consequent, (CC3) automatically comes out true 21 The falsity of (CC1) on the Lewisian semantics means only that it delivers the wrong results about causation when combined with the most naïve of CAACs (which take the truth of (CC1) to be necessary for L = 1 to be a cause of T = 1).
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on the Lewisian semantics.
It follows directly from the truth of (CC2) and (CC3) 
The reason is that the interventionist semantics has us consider exactly the same worlds in evaluating ( †) and ( ‡) as the Lewisian semantics has us consider in evaluating (!) and (‼). First, the interventionist semantics has us consider the same worlds in evaluating ( †) as the Lewisian semantics has us consider in evaluating (!): namely those in which such a combination of miracles occurs as, not only to set X = x, Z 1 = z 1 * , …, and Z n = z n * , but also to set U 1 = u 1 , …, U m = u m, T 1 = t 1 , …, and T k = t k , thus suppressing the independent influence on Y of any of the miracles introduced (no further miracles are required to set S 1 = s 1 , …, and S j = s j since these are the factors that threaten to be disturbed by a miracle setting X = x', rather than one setting X = x).
Second, the interventionist semantics has us consider the same worlds in evaluating ( ‡) as the Lewisian semantics has us consider in evaluating (‼): namely those in which such a combination of miracles occurs as, not only to set X = x', Z 1 = z 1 * , …, and Z n = z n * , but also to set U 1 = u 1 , …, U m = u m , S 1 = s 1 , …, and S j = s j , thus suppressing the independent influence on Y of any of the miracles introduced (no further miracles are required to set T 1 = t 1 , …, and T k = t k since these are the factors that threaten to be disturbed by a miracle setting X = x, rather than one setting X = x').
The truth of (!) and (‼) implies the existence of a path ⟨X, Y⟩ in the Lewisian model constructed from the variable set {X, 
is permissible, we therefore get the result that X = x is a cause of Y = y when we combine SCMAACs with the Lewisian semantics.
Does the permissibility of the contingency It also counts as permissible on the non-interference account. On that account it is required that, when the off-path variables take the values specified by the contingency and X takes its actual value X = x, the remaining on-path variables (in this case just Y) take their actual values (in this case, Y = y). That this is so is indicated by the truth of (!). And the truth of (!) on the Lewisian semantics follows (as shown above) from the truth of ( †) on the interventionist semantics. This raises a question for the interventionist. We saw that, in the passage quoted in the previous section, Woodward says that the interventionist semantics tells us to avoid transition periods altogether. This suggests that an intervention on X with respect to Y that sets X = x' will comprise a late miracle, together with further miracles to 'cancel or remove' any independent effects that the intervention would otherwise have on Y. But it has just been suggested that if we really avoid transition periods altogether (even vanishingly small ones), by having the miracle occur no earlier than X = x', then the miracle is no longer distinct from the event -X = x' -that it secures.
But if it is not distinct, then (I) it cannot be an actual cause of X = x' (as the definition IN of an intervention demands); and (II) it seems that it cannot have any effects upon Y that are independent of those that it has via setting X = x'. So if an intervention on X with respect to Y that sets X = 26 Taking the relevant miracle to be non-distinct from L = 0 makes no difference to the Lewisian's response (discussed in the previous section) to the threat of under-generation, which goes through just as before.
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x' avoids transition periods altogether by comprising the latest possible miracle setting X = x', then (trivially) it will not have to comprise any further miracles, since there can be no effects upon Y of this first miracle that are independent of its influence on X = x' (a fortiori there are no independent effects to cancel or remove).
It would therefore be more natural to construe Woodward, not as claiming that we should really avoid transition periods altogether, but rather as claiming that we should avoid gratuitous transition periods. In other words, an intervention on X with respect to Y that sets X = x' should not comprise the latest possible miracle. That is, it should not be construed as comprising a miracle that simply is the fact that X = x'. Rather, it should be construed as comprising a late-ish miracle which, while not occurring too long before the event represented by X = x', nevertheless remains distinct from that event. As such it is capable of acting as an actual cause of X = x' as well as potentially having an independent influence on Y that the further constituent miracles of the intervention must suppress.
So what does the interventionist semantics imply about the counterfactual (CC4)? We are to suppose the antecedent L = 0 to be realized by a late-ish miracle (perhaps an instantaneous shift of your car very shortly before you arrive at the exit, rather than when you arrive at the exit). This miracle is distinct from the event represented by L = 0 and consequently is able to exert an influence on whether or not box N is ticked independently of its influence on whether or not you're in the left-hand lane at the relevant time. The interventionist semantics tells us that, in evaluating (CC4), the relevant worlds to consider are those in which this influence is suppressed (miraculously the scientists fail to observe the anomaly, or fail to record it by ticking box A instead of N). If this is correct, then the counterfactual (CC4) will come out false on the interventionist semantics. Consequently, there is no counterfactual dependence of N = 1 on L = 1 under the null contingency relative to the direct path ⟨L, N⟩ in the interventionist model constructed from the variable set {L, N}. Unless there is some richer variable set relative to which there is contingent dependence of N = 1 on L = 1 (and it is at least unobvious that there is), SCMAACs, when combined with the interventionist semantics, will yield the result that your being in the left-hand lane was not a cause of box N being ticked. This result is the opposite of the 30 result derived from combining SCMAACs with the Lewisian semantics, on its late miracles variant. This shows that the two semantics do not provide equivalent foundations for SCMAACs.
Which result is intuitively correct? And which semantics is therefore to be favored? As I've argued it seems to me that your being in the left-hand lane when you arrive at the exit is a (partial)
cause of the scientists' ticking box N. Still, I don't think it's necessary to set too much store by this intuition. Perhaps the fact that the intuition is elicited by emphasizing the circumstances that obtained (that in fact you were in the left-hand lane at all times previously) suggests that the intuition about causation is sensitive to how we evaluate the counterfactual: whether, as the late miracles variant of the Lewisian semantics requires, we hold fixed the fact that you were in the left-hand lane at all times previously; or whether, as the interventionist semantics requires, we don't. If so the intuition perhaps reflects the existence of two reasonable ways to evaluate the counterfactuals relevant to causation (though, as I have been arguing, we must insist upon one of these ways -the Lewisian way -if we are to effect a reduction of causation to non-causal facts).
Conclusion
Woodward influentially combines a SCMAAC with an interventionist semantics for the counterfactuals encoded in causal models. Woodward's formulation of the interventionist semantics appeals to (a) actual causation; and (b) the notion of a directed path in a causal model.
In virtue of its appeal to these notions, the adoption of this semantics is incompatible with the project of reductively analyzing actual causation in terms of counterfactual dependence, where counterfactual dependence is itself reductively analyzed in other (non-causal and noncounterfactual) terms. Yet Woodward argues that adopting the interventionist semantics is necessary in order to overcome counterexamples that afflict CAACs when they are combined with the rival, Lewisian semantics.
I have argued that this is not so. whenever the interventionist semantics implies that Y = y counterfactually depends upon X = x under a permissible contingency in an appropriate causal model (a condition that SCMAACs take to be necessary and sufficient for X = x to be an actual cause of Y = y), the Lewisian semantics implies this too.
The Lewisian semantics, on its 'early miracles' variant, is susceptible to the converse charge:
namely that it results in over-generation. But this needn't force us to accept the interventionist semantics and to abandon the project of reduction. By going for the 'late miracles' variant of the Lewisian semantics, over-generation is avoided.
My strategy has not been to argue that the combination of SCMAACs with the interventionist semantics yields an extensionally inadequate theory of causation. My aim, rather, has been to defend the extensional adequacy of the combination of SCMAACs with a Lewisian semantics. Indeed, in §5, I argued that the latter combination yields equivalent results to the former in a certain class of cases. And while, in §6, I argued that a suitable variant of the Lewisian semantics actually appears (in combination with SCMAACs) to yield superior results to the interventionist semantics in another class of cases, I acknowledged that either result might be regarded as acceptable.
My conclusion, then, is that since plausible SCMAACs perform just as well when combined with the Lewisian semantics (on its 'late miracles' variant) as when combined with the interventionist semantics, and since the Lewisian semantics does not make reference to causal or counterfactual notions, a reductive counterfactual analysis of actual causation remains a reasonable hope.
